Executive Summary

This report exposes a persistent and strategic pattern of exploitation by China’s defense research and industrial base targeting U.S. intelligence research programs, particularly those funded by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA). Through systematic analysis, collaboration, and dual-funding arrangements, institutions tied to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) have accessed, sought to replicate, reverse-engineer, and adapt IARPA taxpayer-funded projects, many of which have clear national security implications. All while China’s internal surveillance system, anchored by MPS projects like Skynet, Sharp Eyes, and Safe City, has evolved into a nationwide biometric dragnet enabling real-time tracking of both citizens and foreign operatives.

Despite IARPA’s Research and Technology Protection (RTP) process being hailed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as far back as 2014, and other federal authorities as a model of security best practices, safeguards ultimately failed to prevent adversarial exploitation. China’s defense research and industrial base have openly dissected IARPA’s technical objectives, acquisition models, and national security value chains to inform China’s own R&D efforts in surveillance, AI, behavioral analytics, and cognitive warfare.

Chinese police and military universities, including the Chinese People’s Public Security University, the PLA Information Engineering University, and the PLA’s National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), have published detailed assessments of IARPA’s behavioral analytics, anticipatory intelligence frameworks, and project structuring. These assessments are operational analyses conducted to identify, extract, and adapt U.S. innovations for deployment in Chinese state security operations. This activity fits squarely within China’s broader military-civil fusion strategy (MCF, 军事民用融合), which is a Chinese national strategy that seeks to eliminate barriers between the civilian and military sectors, enabling the PLA to directly access and apply cutting-edge technologies developed in academia, industry, and abroad. Under MCF, civilian institutions and companies are legally obligated to share innovations with the PLA to accelerate China’s military modernization.

Case studies documented in this report reveal PRC-affiliated researchers participating in active IARPA-funded projects across a range of sensitive disciplines, projects designed specifically to advance the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC). These engagements, many of which occurred in the open through dual affiliations, joint publications, or subcontracting, reveal a critical breakdown in America’s research security posture and due diligence efforts. This raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of IARPA’s RTP program in conducting research security, due diligence vetting, and post-award compliance and monitoring.

IARPA’s own mission statement makes its national security orientation unmistakably clear: “to push the boundaries of science to develop solutions that empower the IC to do its work better and more efficiently for national security.” While IARPA itself does not deploy technologies operationally, it explicitly states that it “facilitates the transition of research results to [its] IC customers for operational application.” In other words, the fundamental purpose of IARPA-funded research is to equip the USIC with strategic advantage through cutting-edge scientific innovation. Given this mission, it raises a critical and urgent question: Why are researchers funded by IARPA awards not explicitly prohibited from conducting joint research or collaborating with entities tied to China’s defense research and industrial base?

The USIC must prohibit any collaboration, direct or indirect, between intelligence research programs and China’s defense research and industrial base. This includes joint publications, subcontracting, co-funding, or participation by any entity affiliated with China’s defense research and industrial base. Absent immediate policy action, rigorous enforcement mechanisms, enhanced analytic due diligence vetting, and a reassessment of failed protection frameworks, the failure to close these channels not only perpetuates the erosion of U.S. technological superiority but also directly subsidizes the advancement of the CCP’s military modernization goals.

Furthermore, allowing IARPA-funded researchers to simultaneously conduct research with adversarial entities, even indirectly through publications, joint labs, or shared pre-published research results, fundamentally undermines the purpose of the U.S. taxpayer-funded intelligence research enterprise. It reflects a policy gap that requires immediate correction.